On the psychophysical law pdf

Institute of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford. You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar. Reprints and Permissions. Neural Effects and the Psychophysical Law.

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If you find something abusive or that does not comply with our terms or guidelines please flag it as inappropriate. This view Fig. Hesketh, However, several authors have cast light on E-mail address: parovel unisi. Parovel, C. Schematic illustrations of launching and triggering stimuli conWgurations.

The arrows length is proportional to the speed. S1 moves in a straight line and stops when it reaches S2, which moves oV along the same trajectory. If V2 is larger than V1, then S2 seems triggered by the arrival of S1 b.

The duration of the pause at the contact allows 40 ms or disrupts ms any causal impression. It showed that observers spontane- However, Curran and Braddick demonstrated that ously describe spatio-temporal contingencies as social perceived speed of global dot motion was consistent with behaviour: moving geometrical shapes are perceived as vector average and not vector sum, while Wilson et al.

In particular, do diVerences in mechanical showing that the visual system can diVerentiate local veloc- causality and triggering relate to perceptual diVerences in ity with very high precision, with many Casco, Grieco, perceived motion? However, other data tionship between causality and perceived speed.

Indeed, demonstrate a segregation diYculty, since the two opposite since two speeds are presented consecutively after a short perceptual eVects — integration and diVerentiation — often interval they could be perceptually integrated, so that the account for the Wnal percept.

For example in the motion judgment of one speed could be aVected by the other. If contrast or induced motion phenomenon, apparent velocity they were integrated, the way could be diVerent for diVerent of a target depends strongly on its velocity in relation to its causal events such as mechanical causality and triggering.

Verghese and McKee dem- stant, a dissociation that could account for diVerences in onstrated that the spatial layout is important in speed dis- the phenomenal description of the two events.

The neural bases of integration and diVerentiation are well known. They could be mediated by 2. General method mechanisms of both early level where lateral interactions between neurons underlying local speed estimation may The stimuli Fig.

This causal pair had a short interval between move- ception. Interestingly, while averaging of V1 and V2 has not ments 40 ms and produced the Michotte phenomena of a launching or been tested with perceptual causality displays before, aver- b triggering, depending on V1. The interval between the two events was ms. By pressing one of two alternative keys, observers compared the speed The kind of speed misperception that can be originated of S2 in the causal pair V2causal with that of S2 in the second pair by causality displays can be predicted on the basis of phe- V2probe , where the interval between S1 and S2 was ms, to indicate which of the two was faster.

V1probe was equal to V1causal. In the Wrst experiment we mea- changes of the kinematics of the second moving object due sured how perceived V2 depended on V1 for diVerent levels of V1 in both to the Wrst. Michotte clearly described the causality phe- launching and triggering. In Experiment 2, we tested perceived V2 in nomenon as a causal relationship in one direction only: other causal conWgurations producing mechanical launching.

In Experi- that is, V1 causes V2. This lead us to ask, if misperception ment 3, we aimed at assessing whether misperception of V2 was speciWc to perception of causality. V1 was constant in a block. We judgment of V2 would be observed as a consequence of measured the probability of perceiving V2 in the causal conWguration integration between V1 and V2.

Observers viewed the display binocularly and Our main goal in all experiments was to isolate a possi- were free to track. Using the method of constant stimuli, a block of trials randomly presented consisted of 10 repetitions of each V2probe level. Psy- ble speed misperception, speciWc to causal displays. In par- chometric functions were Wtted to the probability of perceiving V2causal ticular, we asked whether, in these displays, V2 was faster than V2probe as a function of V2probe levels.

The point of subjective correctly perceived or else depended on V1. Furthermore, equality PSE indicated the overestimation of V2causal, i. Finally, we sought, sion of causality. In Experiment 1, we also asked subjects to discriminate in Experiment 1, a possible psychophysical law describing between passive and active motion of S2.

In the current study, observers viewed the classical Repeated-measures ANOVAs compared either PSEs or Ratings obtained with diVerent levels of V1 separately for triggering and launching Michotte conWguration pair of squares : the Wrst square in Experiment 1 or with diVerent causal conWgurations Experiments 2 and moved until it made contact with the second. The second 3. Pairwise comparisons were made using t-test with Bonferroni correction. In this causal event, 3. Experiment 1 the interval between the two movements was very short and should produce impression of causality.

Observers were In Experiment 1 we asked whether perceived V2 asked to compare the speed of the second square in this depended on V1, that is whether diVerent causality events event with the speed of a second square in a subsequently were associated with diVerences in the perception of V2.

Method Our novel Wnding was that speciWcally for the causality displays, misperception of V2 resulted in an overestimation. In the test condition, observers compared V2causal 40 ms Overestimation was not found with displays that did not interval with V2probe ms and PSEs were measured produce causal impression.

Moreover, overestimation was for diVerent levels of V1 in both launching and triggering. V1 was varied in independent blocks placed with respect to control, indicating a large overestima-. Eight subjects there is no overestimation in the control condition mean participated, six naives and the two authors.

PSE D 3. They were also perceived, overestimate of V2 increases in proportion to V1. S required for a change to be T-test revealed that mean perceived causality Ratings were detectable:!

The psychometric function dashed line obtained when both conWgurations did not produce perceptual causality probe vs probe is shown as control condition. Thus, V2 is not assessed independently, rather it is lapped S2 as it ended its trajectory.

In this condition, perceived as a variation of V1. Michotte and, more recently, Scholl and Nakayama Fig. S2 R2 D l0. This rithmic function gave a better Wt. This Wnding suggests that V2 overestimation is a conse- produces the impression of a collision between the two quence of V1, but is independent on its value. This could objects, even if they do not contact, as if the second object have, as phenomenal correlate, the perception of V2 as a were pushed by a force across an invisible medium.

Since the relationship between V1 and V2 did not aVect perceived causality as such but the way S2 motion was per- 4. PSEs were equal related to speed overestimation, the change in slope reXects to 3. The autonomous or belonging to V1. Bonabeau, E. Swarm intelligence: A whole new way to think about business.

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